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The DOJ’s Tools to Combat the Opioid Crisis: Do They Work? 
I. INTRODUCTION  
A. THE OPIOID CRISIS  
The United States is confronted by an enormous public health crisis relating to 
prescription opioid drugs. Although the total number of drug overdose deaths decreased by four 
percent from 2017 to 2018, the number of drug overdose deaths was still four times higher in 
2018 than in 1999 with the death toll over 67,000 in the United States alone.1 Of that, 
prescription opioids were involved in 32% of all opioid deaths in 2018.2 Abuse of prescription 
opioid pain medications has become a substantial public health epidemic throughout the nation.3 
Prescriptions opioids are found on the streets in the United States more than any other developed 
nation.4 An estimated 2.5 million Americans have an opioid use disorder and the epidemic 
continues to grow.5 
This article will examine how federal law enforcement has responded to the opioid 
epidemic through a variety of legal tools. This article will focus on several initiatives including 
the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) prosecutions under the False Claims Act (FCA), the 
Controlled Substances Act (CSA), the federal Anti-Kickback Statute (AKS), and the newly 
enacted Eliminating Kickbacks in Recovery Act of 2018 (EKRA). Seeing that this epidemic is 
complex, this article will focus specifically on one underlying cause: the over-prescription of 
opioids and, in particular, the gaps in federal regulations that present issues in enforcement as 
 
1 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Understanding the Epidemic. (last reviewed March 19, 2020). 
https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/epidemic/index.html  
2  CDC, supra note 1 
3 Jeanette M Tetrualt & Jenna L. Butner, Non-Medical Prescription Opioid Use and Prescription Opioid Use 
Disorder: A Review., 88 Yale J. Biol. Med. 222, 227-33 (2015).  
4 Id.  
5Ameet Sarpatwari, Michael S. Sinha & Aaron S. Kesselheim, The Opioid Epidemic: Fixing a Broken 
Pharmaceutical Market, 11 Harvard L. Pol’y Rew. 463, 463 (2017).  
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well as regulation of prescription opioids. Furthermore, this article will examine EKRA, a newly-
enacted law intended to combat entities who specifically take advantage of those who are 
suffering with addiction. This examination will show that different legal tools are most 
appropriate to deal with issues at various places along the prescription drug supply chain.  
a. Causes of the Opioid Crisis 
Because the opioid crisis is complex and multifaceted, it is important to note the various 
players in the system and how prescription drugs enter the market and reach users. Drug 
manufacturers, distributors, pharmacies, doctors, patients, and dealers each have a unique and 
significant role in the narrative of the current opioid crisis. The narrative often begins with 
pharmaceutical manufacturers who research, develop and promote the drug for particular uses.6 
Pharmaceutical distributors purchase prescription medicines and other medical products directly 
from the manufacturer for storage in warehouses and distribution centers across the country.7 
Distributors then deliver the drugs to state-regulated pharmacies, hospitals and other drug 
retailers.8 For a patient to then get the medicine from a hospital or pharmacy, it must start with a 
prescription. Physicians make the clinical decisions as to who should or should not receive a 
medicine or what medicine is best for a particular patient. Along this supply chain, there are 
various opportunities for the drugs to be abused and diverted into illegal channels and used for 
non-medical uses.9 
 
6 Thomas N. Palermo, The Opioid Crisis, American Bar Association. (2019). 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/criminal_justice/publications/criminal-justice-magazine/2019/winter/opioid-
crisis/  
7 Healthcare Distribution Alliance. Pharmaceutical Distributors: Understanding Our Role in the Supply Chain. 
https://www.hda.org/about/role-of-distributors (last visited May 1, 2020).  
8 Id.  
9 Congressional Research Service, The Controlled Substance Act (CSA): A legal Overview of the 116th Congress, 2. 
(Oct. 9,2019). https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45948.pdf 
   
4 
 
Opioid prescriptions in the United States quadrupled between 1999 and 2018. 
Epidemiologists view the progression of opioid use in three waves.10 The first wave began in 
1999 (which is why it is typically used as a starting point in most statistics) when there was an 
initial rise in prescription opioid overdose deaths.11 The second wave started in 2010 when a very 
stark rise in heroin overdose deaths occurred.12 The third wave arrived soon after in 2013 where 
another stark rise in overdose deaths occurred at the hands of synthetic opioids, particularly those 
involving illicitly manufactured fentanyl.13 The National Institute of Drug Abuse reported that 
this was the sharpest increase with more than 28,400 overdose deaths in 2017.14 These official 
mortality figures are likely undercounted, since the data do not include those who were revived 
by Narcan (an overdose reversing drug), but had already suffered brain injury due to lack of 
oxygen.15 Many users die weeks later of pneumonia or other overdose-induced complications.16 
While this article will focus more narrowly on the particular legal context that presents an 
opportunity to help alleviate the opioid crisis, it is important to recognize some of the broader 
forces that may also contribute to the epidemic. There are several causes to the opioid epidemic  
such as the reliance of pharmacotherapy treatments17 and the limited access to drug treatment 
through Medicate and other insurance coverage, 18 but this is not the focus of this paper.  Instead, 
 
10 CDC, supra note 1.  
11 Id.  
12 Id.  
13 Id.  
14 National Institute on Drug Abuse, New Jersey: Opioid-Involved Deaths and Related Harms. (April 2020). 
https://www.drugabuse.gov/opioid-summaries-by-state/new-jersey-opioid-summary 
15 Rachel L. Rothberg & Kate StithGuest. Symposium: Law and the Opioid Crisis: The Opioid Crises and Federal 
Criminal Prosecution, 46 J.L Med. & Ethics 292.  
16 Id.  
17 Victor Absil, Efficient Prosecution of False Claims Act Violation May Help Relive the Current Opioid Crisis. 45 
American Journal of Law & Medicine 253, 255 (2019). 
18 Id.  
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this paper will focus on arguably the main underlying cause of the opioid epidemic – the over-
prescription of drugs. 19   
American doctors prescribe three times more opioids than European doctors.20 Opioid 
prescriptions have increased by more than 300 percent since 1999 while doctors prescribed about 
three hundred million opioids in 2015 alone.21 When physicians prescribe an overabundance of 
opioids, abuse and overreliance become more likely and will eventually pose a danger to the 
overall public health. Studies have shown that “approximately half of opioid prescriptions are for 
indications and durations for which evidence of effectiveness is weak or nonexistent….”22 If this 
is the case, it seems likely that the risk of abuse and reliance would outweigh the benefits of a the 
short-term opioid pain treatment. Prescription opioids can lead to addiction, produce negative 
mental and physical side effects, and are no more effective than non-opioid painkillers at treating 
many long and short-term issues.23 While many prescription opioids do help people suffering 
from pain, experts have underestimated the potential for opioid misuse and addiction. A solution 
does not call for a complete elimination of prescription opioids, but rather, the elimination of 
inappropriate prescriptions, allocating funding for treatments that utilize counseling, and 
conducting further research to alternative treatments and into the conditions that give rise to 
chronic physical and mental pain.24 
A subsequent issue to the overabundance of prescription opioids is the overpayment by 
government in health care expenditure. An overabundance has cost the government billions of 
 
19 Corey S. Davis, The Law and Policy of Opioids for Pain Management, Addiction Treatment, and Overdose 
Reversal, 1 Ind. Heal. L. Rev. 1, 1-22 (2017).  
20 See Absil at 256.  
21 Corey S. Davis & Derek Carr, Physician continuing education to reduce opioid misuse, abuse and overdose: 
Many opportunities, few requirements. 163 Elsevier 100,107 (2016). 
22  Davis and Carr, supra note 21, at 100.  
23 Id.  
24 See Absil at 257.  
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dollars in health care spending in false claims, criminal activity and decreased economic 
productivity of people with opioid use disorders.25 Additionally, the government loses money 
when it pays for prescription claims that, if it knew were false, it would not have reimbursed the 
prescription. This article will focus next on the DOJ’s response of the opioid epidemic through 
various legal remedies including the False Claims Act (FCA), which directly addresses the issue 
noted above.  
II. DOJ’s INIATIVES  
In 2016, the DOJ dedicated its United States Attorneys’ Bulletin to “Addressing the 
Heroin and Opioid Crisis.”26 In the bulletin, then-Deputy Attorney General (DAG) Sally Quillian 
Yates emphasized the importance that any solution by the federal government “must be 
holistic”.27 This included the cooperation of several agencies such as the Drug Enforcement 
Agency (DEA), the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force Program, and the Bureau of 
Justice Assistance’s Prescription Drug Monitoring Grant Programs.28 The Trump administration 
maintained the opioid-related initiatives announced by Yates when President Trump declared the 
opioid crisis a nationwide “public health emergency.”29 
In addition to combatting drugs on the street, the DOJ took further measures to bring 
legal actions based on the investigation efforts of the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services (HHS), the Health Care Fraud Prevention Team, and Medicare Fraud Strike Force. The 
Medicare Fraud Strike Force Teams in particular brings together efforts of the Office of the 
 
25 Aaron M. Gilson & Paul G. Kreis, The Burden of the nonmedical use of prescription opioid Analgesics, 10 PAIN 
MED. 89, 95 (2009). 
26 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Executive Office for the United States Attorneys, "Addressing the Heroin and Opioid 
Crisis," United States Attorneys' Bulletin 64, no. 5 (2016): 1-91. 
27 Id.  
28 Id. 
29 The White House, Ending America’s Opioid Crisis (2017) (President Trump’s nationwide call to action declaring 
the opioid crisis a public health emergency and the administration applying an all-of-government approach to 
stopping the crisis). 
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Inspector General (OIG), DOJ, and FBI to successfully investigate and identify fraud relating to 
health care.30  
One of the earliest and most notable enforcement efforts by the OIG was in 2007 during 
the investigation of Purdue Pharma – the company that manufactures the narcotic painkiller 
OxyContin. Purdue and three executives pled guilty “to criminal charges that they misled 
regulators, doctors and patients about the drug’s risk of addition and its potential to be abused.”31 
Because of the DOJ’s authority to bring both civil and criminal charges, the company agreed to 
pay over $600 million in fines and the executives a total of $34.6 million.32 Experts believe that 
the power opioid painkiller strength and addictive potential contributed to the current opioid 
epidemic, which may be why it was the largest settlement paid by a pharmaceutical manufacturer 
at the time.33 The DOJ continues to pursue these civil and criminal actions against fraudulent 
medical practices in a fight to combat the growth of the opioid epidemic.34 The DOJ’s legal tools 
and initiatives have displayed their effectiveness in prosecuting bad actors in the health care 
supply chain. However, this article will reveal several gaps in the laws that federal prosecutors 
rely on in prosecuting those who are exploiting the crisis.  
A. THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT 
a. Background of the FCA  
 
30 HHS Office of the Inspector General, Medicare Fraud Strike Force. https://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/strike-force/ 
31 CNN Money, Purdue in $634 million settlement over OxyContin, (July 20, 2007). 
https://money.cnn.com/2007/07/20/news/companies/purdue/index.htm 
32 Id. 
33 Jamie Ducharme, Time, Allegations Against the Maker of OxyContin Are Piling Up. Here’s What They Could 
Mean for the Billionaire Family Behind Purdue Pharma. (February 22, 2019). https://time.com/5520159/purdue-
pharma-lawsuits/  
34 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice (DOJ), Office of Pub. Affairs, Justice Department Celebrates 25th 
Anniversary of False Claims Act Amendments of 1986. (Jan. 31, 2012). https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-
department-celebrates-25th-anniversary-false-claims-act-amendments-1986 
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 The first relevant law that this article will address in the attempt to combat the opioid 
crisis is the FCA. The FCA is arguably among the most powerful weapons the government has in 
its arsenal to combat healthcare fraud and abuse.35 The FCA was initially passed to impose civil 
liability for fraudulent claims submitted to the government. Eventually the practice of using 
private citizens to sue on behalf of the government proved to be an efficient law enforcement 
strategy.36 FCA prosecutions permitted the government to seek treble damages and use the qui 
tam, or whistleblower, provision to incentivize whistleblowers to come forward with allegations 
of fraud.37 A large portion of FCA recovery has come from settlements from health care 
companies.38  
 The False Claims Act imposes civil liabilities for violations that occur when an 
individual: (1) “knowingly presents or causes to be presented, a false or fraudulent claim for 
payment or approval” to the federal government, including a false Medicare or Medicaid claim;  
(2) “knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used a false record or statement material to 
a false or fraudulent claim.”39 Examples of Medicare, Medicaid, and other federal claims that 
violate the FCA include claims for health care services not actually provided, claims that 
misrepresent the level of health care services that were provided, and claims for unnecessary 
health services.40 Knowing conduct includes conduct involving actual knowledge of a falsehood 
 
35 Robert Salcido, Mixing Oil and Water: The Government’s Mistaken Use of the Medicare Anti-Kickback Statute in 
False Claims Act Prosecutions, 6 Annals health L. 105 (1997).  
36 Jr. Helmer, James & Robert Clark Neff, War Stories: A History of the Qui Tam Provisions of the False Claims 
Act, The 1986 Amendments to the False Claims Act, and the Application, 18 Ohio North. Univ. Law. Rev. 35, 35 
(1991).  
37 Press Release, supra note 34.  
38 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, Justice Dep’t Recovers over $3 Billion from False 
Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2019. (Jan. 9, 2020). https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-recovers-
over-3-billion-false-claims-act-cases-fiscal-year-2019 
39 31 U.S.C. §3729(a)(1)(A)-(B) (2012). 
40 Stacey A. Tovino, Fraud, Abuse, Opioids, 67 U. Kan. L. Rev. 901, 921 (2019). 
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as well as conduct involving deliberate ignorance or reckless disregard of the truth.41 The act 
does not require specific intent to defraud.42  
 FCA claims may be classified as factually false or legally false. Factually false claims 
include claims that are false on their face, such as claims for nonexistent care provided to 
fictitious patients or claims supported by falsified medical records.43 Legally false claims, at first 
glance, may appear to be facially, technically accurate in the sense that a provider may have seen 
a patient in the office, however it becomes legally false because a provider may have failed to 
meet a regulation in connection to the office visit.44 Legally false claims may be further divided 
into express false certifications and implied false certifications, depending on the type of 
certification made (or not) on the claim or invoice.45 Express false certifications occur when a 
claimant makes an “explicitly false certification of compliance with an underlying program 
condition, such as by signing a false certification statement” on a claim.46 In the absence of such 
express certifications, an implied false certification occurs when a claimant submits a 
reimbursement claim without disclosing that the claimant is in violation of a legal requirement 
that affects the claimant’s eligibility.47 
 In 2016 the Supreme Court addressed the circuit split regarding whether the government 
could use an implied false certification as a basis for a FCA violation in Universal Health 
 
41 Id. at 922.  
42 31 U.S.C. 3729(b)(1) (2012). 
43 Christopher L. Martin, Jr., Reining in Lincoln's Law: A Call to Limit the Implied 
Certification Theory of Liability Under the False Claims Act, 101 CAL. L. Rev. 227, 230 (2013) 
("Courts originally interpreted the phrase 'false or fraudulent claim' in a limited fashion to mean a 'factually false 
claim,' which is a claim for payment containing 'an incorrect description of goods or services provided or a request 
for reimbursement for goods or services never provided.'”). 
44 See Tovino at 922.  
45  Joan H. Krause, Reflections on Certification, Interpretation, and the Quest for Fraud that "Counts" under the 
False Claims Act, 2017 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1811, 1812-13 (2017). 
46 Id. at 1817. 
47 Id. 
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Services Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar.48 The Court held that the implied certification 
theory can serve as a basis for FCA liability.49 When a claim is submitted to the government, 
there is an implied certification that all material laws and regulations have been complied with.50 
If a noncompliant claim has been submitted, it would then materially influence the government’s 
decision to pay and thus the FCA would be implicated.51 It is important to also note that the FCA 
violation is undermined when the law being violated is not material to the government’s decision 
to pay.52 The FCA’s application hinges off of the statute’s materiality element. Whether or not a 
claim is considered “false”, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, depends on whether the 
government would have paid for the claim.53 The Act defines “material” as having a natural 
tendency to influence or is capable of influencing payment.54  
 Under the FCA’s qui tam provisions, a private person, known as “relator,” may enforce 
the statute by filing a complaint, under seal, setting forth allegations of fraud committed against 
the government.55 The government will then investigate these allegations and the DOJ can 
intervene in the action and lift the seal from the complaint assuming the primary responsibility 
for prosecuting the claim.56 The FCA is popular among fraud prosecutions because if the 
government prevails on the merits, it is awarded treble damages plus penalties for each false 
claim. 57 In addition, the relator or whistleblower may recover 15 to 25% of the government’s 
recovery, plus legal fees and expenses.58 For the FCA to attach to criminal penalties, the 
 
48 See Universal Health Services v. U.S. ex rel. Escobar, 579 US 1, 14 (2016).  
49 Id. at 11.  
50 Id.  
51 Id.  
52 Absil at 260. 
53 Universal Health Services at 14.  
54 See 31 U.S.C. §3729(b)(4) (2012).  
55 Salcido at 106.  
56 Id.  
57 See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) & 3730(d)(1) (2012).  
58 See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(2) (2012).  
   
11 
 
fraudulent claim submitted must also implicate a federal criminal statute such as the Anti-
kickback statute, which will be discussed later in this article.59  
b. Applying the FCA in the Context of Opioids  
  False claims submitted to the government are a key gateway for prescription opioids that 
are not medically indicated to enter the community.60 Although Universal Health Services, 
received significant attention in regards to the legally false certification theory of FCA liability, 
health industry participants that prescribe or dispense opioids violate more traditional provisions 
within the FCA.61 Prescription opioids, when not medically indicated, enter the streets when a 
physician prescribes opioids that are not considered a “medical necessity” implicating a factually 
false claim.62  Medicare and Medicaid programs only provide payment for those healthcare 
services that are “reasonable and necessary for the diagnosis or treatment of illness or injury.”63  
 The FCA is violated when it can be proven that the defendant submitted a claim for an 
item or service when the defendant knew those items and services were not medically necessary 
or where the defendant knowingly falsified medical records to make a medically unnecessary 
item or service appear necessary.64  For example, if a physician knowingly lies to the 
government about the medical necessity or did not properly document what is medically 
necessary when submitting a claim, the FCA is implicated.65  
 In January 2018, Matthew Anderson, a chiropractor who worked in Tennessee, agreed to 
pay $1.45 million plus interest to resolve FCA violations and contributing to the state’s opioid 
 
59 Id.  
60 Absil at 262. 
61 Tovino at 928.  
62 Michael W. Youtt, H. Victor Thomas & Adam Robison, False Claims Act Actions - The Developing Case Law 
regarding If and When Opinions of Medical Necessity Can Be Fraudulent, 27 Health Law. 36, 36 (2015). 
63 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (a)(1)(A); 42 C.F.R. § 440.230(d) 
64 Youtt at 36.  
65 Id. at 39. 
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epidemic.66 The government alleged that the defendant and his management company instructed 
employees of his four clinics to up-code office visits by assigning an inaccurate billing code 
increase Medicare reimbursement.67 As a result Anderson caused pharmacies to submit requests 
for Medicare payments for pain killers, including opioids, which were dispensed based upon the 
defendant’s prescriptions 68 “Pill mills” such as this billed medically unnecessary services to 
Medicare, defrauded the government and contributed to opioid abuse and addiction. Fortunately, 
the FCA creates liability not just for those who submitted false claims, but also for those who 
“cause” false reimbursement claims to be made or “cause” false statements to be made in 
connection with claims for reimbursement.69  
 However, “expressions of opinion, scientific judgements , or statements as to conclusions 
about which reasonable minds may differ” cannot be actionable.70 Courts are also in agreement 
that mistaken or negligent certifications or statements regarding medical necessity are not 
actionable.71 However, when a physician prescribes an unnecessary drug, it directly contributes 
to the overabundance of opioids in the hands of who may not need them, effectively enabling 
prescription opioid use disorders.72 
 The medical necessity requirement serves one of the FCA’s limitations in enforcement 
and prosecution. Courts have been hesitant when invaliding a physician’s scientific or medical 
 
66 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, Tennessee Chiropractor Pays 
More Than $1.45 Million to Resolve False Claims Act Allegations (Jan. 24, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/usao-
mdtn/pr/tennessee-chiropractor-pays-more-145-million-resolve-false-claims-act-allegations  
67 Id.  
68 Id.  
69 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A), (B) (2012) (creating liability for "any person who... knowingly ... causes to be 
presented ... a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval" or "knowingly ... causes to be made ... a false 
record or statement material to a false or fraudulent claim.") (emphasis added). 
70 See Youtt at 38. 
71 Id.  
72 See Absil at 262.  
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judgment in fear of undermining their profession.73 Instead, courts have consistently declined to 
find that a contractor’s exercise of scientific or professional judgment as to an applicable 
standard of care falls within the scope of the FCA.74 A scientific dispute on what is “medically 
necessary” for a patient is not always a fraud case and reasonable disagreements in the medical 
or scientific methodology simply do not give rise to FCA liability.75 As stated above, in order 
invoke FCA liability in this context, it must be proven that a defendant submitted a claim for 
government reimbursement that was medically unnecessary, such as the defendant in Tennessee 
noted above. This limitation may allow for physicians and doctors to hide behind the cloak of 
their medical opinions, expressions, and scientific work to justify their fraudulent claims.  
B. THE CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE ACT  
a. Background of the CSA  
 This article will now shift to its second focus: The Controlled Substance Act and its 
effectiveness in combatting the opioid epidemic. The primary federal law governing the 
manufacture, distribution, and use of prescription and illicit opioids is the Controlled Substance 
Act (CSA).76 The Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), a law enforcement agency within the DOJ, 
is principally responsible for administering and enforcing the CSA.77 The CSA provides a 
framework through which the federal government regulates the manufacture, distribution, 
importation, exportation, and use of certain substances which have the potential for abuse or 
psychological or physical dependence, including both illicit and prescription opioids.78  
 
73 See Youtt at 38.  
74 Luckey v. Baxter Healthcare Corp, 2 E Supp. 2d. 1034, 1047 (N.D. Ill. 1998), aff'd, 183 F3d. 730 (7th Cit. 1999). 
75 See Youtt at 39 
76 Congressional Research Service, Legal Authorities Under the Controlled Substances Act to Combat the Opioid 
Crisis. (December 18, 2018). https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45164/6 
77 Id.  
78 Id.  
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 The CSA classifies various plants, drugs, chemicals into one of five schedules based on 
the substances’ medical use, potential for abuse, and safety or dependence liability.79 Schedule I 
contains substances, such as the hallucinogen lysergic acid diethylamide, better known as LSD, 
and the illicit opioid heroin, that have “a high potential for abuse” with “no currently accepted 
medical use in the treatment in the U.S.” and that cannot safely be dispensed under a 
prescription.80 Schedules II, III, IV, and V include substances that have recognized medical uses, 
such as prescription opioids like oxycodone, codeine, and morphine, and may be manufactured, 
distributed, prescribed, dispensed, and possessed in accordance to the CSA.81 
 The CSA also details who must register with the DEA in order to receive authorization to 
handle the substances.82 These “registrants” include manufacturers, distributors, doctors, 
hospitals, pharmacies, and scientific researchers.83 This creates a “closed system” of lawful 
distribution among registered handlers of controlled substances. In addition to this, the CSA 
requires that the DEA establish a quota system that restricts the total amount of certain controlled 
substances that may be annually produced or manufactured.84 The DEA establishes quotas for 
the maximum amount of each basic class of Schedule I and II controlled substances that can be 
produced each year as well as quotas for individual manufacturers who must apply to obtain 
quotas for specific classes of controlled substances.85 This essentially controls the amount of 
controlled substances that can be put into the market and avoiding the overproduction of 
controlled substances.  
 
79 See 21 U.S.C. §§ 801- 904 (2012). 
80 21 U.S.C. § 812(b). 
81 Id.  
82 Id.  
83 Id.  
84 21 U.S.C. §826(a).  
85 29th Annual National Institute on Health Care Fraud, 10 (2019). 
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 Additionally, the CSA provides the legal standards through which the federal government 
prevents diversion of these substances from their legitimate uses and purposes. The DEA uses 
the CSA as a guide to avoid controlled substances which may have lawful uses from entering 
into illicit channels.86 To track this, the CSA and its implementing regulations subject registrants 
to strict requirements regarding recordkeeping, maintaining the security of inventories, and 
reporting to the DEA.87 As part of the registrant’s monitoring process and to ensure compliance 
with the CSA, the DEA conducts three types of investigations – regulatory, complaint , and 
criminal.88 A registrant’s failure to meet the obligations set forth by the CSA can result in the 
diversion of controlled substances, which, in turn, can contribute to drug abuse and addiction.89  
 Like most medicine, prescription opioid pain relievers are safe and effective when used 
as directed, but these highly addictive substances can pose serious risks of addiction or death if 
they are abused, misused, or diverted. These opportunities for abuse or diversion can occur as 
drug flow through the prescription drug supply chain. 90  This supply chain is the means through 
which prescription drugs are ultimately delivered to patients with legitimate medical needs. The 
typical goes as followed: prescription drugs are produced by manufacturers; are purchased and 
stored by distributors, who take orders and deliver them to customers such as pharmacies; and 
ultimately are dispensed by pharmacies to patients who have a prescription from a practitioner.91 
 
86 Improving Predictability and Transparency in DEA and FDA Regulation: Hearing Before the H. Comm. On 
Energy & Commerce, Subcomm. On Health, 113th Congress 1 (2014) (statement by Joseph T. Rannazzisi, DEA).  
87 See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 1304.11(a) (“Each inventory shall contain a complete and accurate record of all controlled 
substances on hand on the date the inventory is taken....”); see also id. § 1301.71(a) (“All applicants and registrants 
shall provide effective controls to guard against theft and diversion of controlled substances.”); see 21 U.S.C. § 832 
(“Each registrant shall—design and operate a system to identify suspicious orders for the registrant … and upon 
discovering a suspicious order or series of orders, notify the Administrator of the Drug Enforcement 
Administration….”). 
88 See supra note 84, 11-12.  
89 See supra note 85.  
90 See supra note 84, 6.  
91  Id. at 8.  
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Along this supply chain, there are various opportunities for the drugs to be abused and diverted 
into illegal channels and used for non-medical uses. A common example of diversion is when an 
individual may visit multiple practitioners posing as a legitimate patient, referred to as a “doctor 
shopper,” to obtain prescriptions for drugs for themselves or others.92 In other more obvious 
cases, diversion can occur when a criminal enterprise robs distributors and pharmacies of 
prescription drugs to illicitly sell to others for a profit.93 
b. Enforcing the CSA in the Context of Opioids  
 The CSA provides the DEA with a variety of criminal, civil, and administrative tools to 
hold manufacturers, distributors, pharmacies, and physicians accountable for violations of the 
CSA’s regulatory requirements.94 Registrants who fail to adhere to the CSA requirements may 
face administrative consequences, civil and criminal fines, and even the possibility of 
imprisonment.95  
 The CSA makes it an offense to “knowingly” possess a “controlled substance” with the 
intent to distribute it. In McFadden v. United States, the Supreme Court explained that “the word 
knowingly applies not just to the statute’s verbs but also to the object of those verbs – ‘a 
controlled substance.’”96 In CSA cases, the federal government has the burden to prove the 
element of mens rea of “knowing” beyond reasonable doubt. This means that the government 
must prove that the defendant “knew” that they possessed a controlled substance.97 A violation 
of the CSA’s registration requirements – including “failure to maintain records or detect and 
report suspicious orders, noncompliance with security requirements, or dispensing controlled 
 
92 Id.  
93 Id.  
94 See 21 U.S.C. § 842(a)(6). 
95 Id.  
96 McFadden v. U.S., 576 U.S. 186, 190 (2015). 
97 Id.  
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substances without the necessary prescriptions.” 98 These violations do not typically constitute a 
criminal offense unless the violation is committed knowingly. In that event, the DOJ has the 
authority to bring criminal charges against both individual and corporate registrants.99  
 Furthermore, the Act’s trafficking provisions allow for prosecution of the illegal 
distribution of controlled substances. Although this may primarily involve the illegal distribution 
of recreational drugs, the CSA applies to illicit activities involving pharmaceutical or non-
pharmaceutical controlled substances.100 “Notably, the CSA’s registration system and its 
trafficking regime are not mutually exclusive, and participation in the registration system does 
not insulate registrants from the statute’s trafficking penalties.” For example, a registered 
physician may be prosecuted under the CSA for illegally prescribing and distributing 
prescription drugs. This provision and interpretation of the CSA has been exponential in 
combatting the overabundance of prescription opioids in the community. In United States v. 
Moore, the Supreme Court rejected a claim that the CSA, “must be interpreted in light of a 
congressional intent to set up two separate and distinct penalty systems,” one for registrants and 
one for non-registrants.101 The Court held that physicians registered under the Act can be 
prosecuted under the drug trafficking provision “when their activities fall outside the usual 
course of professional practice.”102 In other words, when physicians are acting less like medical 
doctors treating patients and more like a large-scale drug pusher.  
 The decision in Moore also upholds convictions of pharmacists who signed thousands of 
prescriptions for sale though an online pharmacy, and a practitioner who “freely distributed 
 
98Congressional Research Service, supra note 9.  
99 Id.  
100 See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 844 (criminalizing the manufacture, distribution, and possession of “a controlled 
substance,” except as authorized by the CSA).  
101 United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122, 133 (1975). 
102 Id. at 124. (The defendant in Moore was a registered doctor who distributed large amount of methadone with 
inadequate patient exams and no precautions against misuse or diversion.) 
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prescriptions for large amounts of controlled substances that are highly addictive, difficult to 
obtain, and sought after for nonmedical purposes…”103 However, one limitation to prosecuting 
bad actors under Moore requires “more than a showing of mere professional malpractice.” For 
example, the Ninth Circuit held that a prosecution must prove that the defendant “acted with 
intent to distribute drugs and with intent to distribute them outside the course of professional 
practice,” suggesting that intent must be established with respect to the nature of the defendant’s 
failure to abide by professional norms.104 
 The DOJ’s prosecution of criminal trafficking charges against doctors and pharmacies 
has proved essential in combatting diversion and ensuring proper regulation of the CSA. This has 
also been seminal in combatting the overabundance of prescription opioids leading to addiction 
and abuse. However, in April 2019, the DOJ used the CSA for the first time to bring criminal 
trafficking charges against a drug distributor .105 The DOJ successfully prosecuted two 
executives of Rochester Drug Cooperative (RDC) on the company’s sale of the opioids 
oxycodone and fentanyl to pharmacies that illegally distributed and diverted the drugs.106 RDC 
was charged with unlawfully distributing oxycodone and fentanyl, defrauding the DEA, and 
failing to report suspicious order to the DEA.107 The DOJ entered into a deferred prosecution 
agree and consent decree with RDC, which has admitted to its misconduct.108 In addition, the 
pharmaceutical paid a substantial penalty, agreed to be supervised by a monitor and make 
significant reforms to its compliance program.109 
 
103 See United States v. McIver, 470 F.3d 550, 564 (4th Cir. 2006). 
104 United States v. Feingold, 454 F.3d 1001, 1008 (9th Cir. 2006). 
105 See U.S. v. Rochester Drug Co-operative, U.S. v. Laurence Doud III, Press conference remarks of U.S. Attorney 
Geoffrey S. Bernam as delivered (Apr. 23, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/page/file/1164191/download 
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 Lastly, CSA cases may also be prosecuted alongside the FCA. Several health industry 
players have settled FCA allegation predicated on violating of material statutes and regulations 
such as the provisions within the CSA.110 In 2015, PharMerica Corporation agreed to pay the 
government $31.5 million “to resolve a lawsuit alleging the pharmacy violated the CSA by 
dispensing Schedule II controlled drugs without a valid prescription and the FCA by submitting 
false claims to Medicare for improperly dispensed drugs.”111 Many of those prescriptions include 
oxycodone and fentanyl, which the pharmacies dispensed without a CSA-required physician 
prescription.112 
 The trend of criminally prosecuting pharmaceuticals under the CSA by the DOJ 
continued. Similarly in July 2019, the DOJ successfully prosecuted the pharmaceutical 
distributor Miami-Luken, Inc. for conspiracy to violate CSA’s trafficking provisions.113 The 
threat of the CSA to all players on the drug supply chain has been effective in combatting the 
overabundance and misuse of prescription opioids.114 In theory, the CSA can be used to 
prosecute any player in the supply chain that is required to become a registrant with the DEA. 
There have been proposals targeting the “imminent danger” requirement. Specifically the bill 
would lower the threshold for what constitutes imminent danger, requiring “probable cause that 
death, serious bodily harm, or abuse” will occur in the absence of an immediate suspension of 
DEA registration.115 The opioid epidemic has been driven by the greed of pharmaceutical 
 
110 See Tovino at 930.  
111 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, Long-Term Care Pharmacy to 
Pay $31.5 Million to Settle Lawsuit Alleging Violations of Controlled Substances Act and False 
Claims Act (May 14, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/long-term-care-pharmacy-pay-315-million-settle-
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manufacturers, distributors, and physicians who exploit those with prescription drug abuse and 
fuel the opioid epidemic.  
 In recent years, we have already seen several legislative proposals enacted into law to 
prevent the illicit distribution of opioids. In 2016, Congress enacted the Comprehensive 
Addiction and Recovery Act (CARA) and the 21st Century Cures Act (Cures Act) which 
authorizes grants for educational programs to address the opioid crisis in areas including abuse 
prevention, law enforcement, and treatment. These Acts also provided additional funding to 
states combatting opioid addiction.116 However, in 2018, Congress went even further to enact the 
SUPPORT Act (Substance Use-Disorder Prevention that Promotes Opioid Recovery and 
Treatment for Patients and Communities Act).117 This Act included amendments to the CSA to 
include provisions expanding access to medication-assisted treatment (MAT), revising the 
factors DEA considers when establishing opioid production quotas, and codifying the definition 
of “suspicious order.”118 
 To further address the opioid crisis, there are several gaps in the CSA that can still be 
filled. The CSA can allow for stricter requirements for registrants, specifically medical 
practitioners, to certify that they will not prescribe more prescription opioids than necessary for 
the treatment of short-term pain.119 The John S. McCain Opioid Addiction Prevention Act has 
already been proposed to limit a prescription of no more than a seven-day supply of opioids for 
 
116 Pub. L. No. 115-271, 132 Stat. 3894 (2018); see also CRS Report R45449, The SUPPORT for Patients and 
Communities Act (P.L.115-271): Medicare Provisions, coordinated by Suzanne M. Kirchhoff; CRS Report R45423, 
Public Health and Other Related Provisions in P.L 115-271, the SUPPORT for Patients and Communities Act, 
coordinated by Elayne J. Heisler and Johnathan H. Duff; CRS Report R45405, The SUPPORT for Patients and 
Communities Act (P.L. 115-271): Food and Drug Administration and Controlled Substance Provisions, coordinated 
by Agata Dabrowska. 
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the treatment of acute pain.120 Moreover, with the growing rise of the synthetic opioid, fentanyl, 
amending the CSA by reducing the amounts of fentanyl needed for a trafficking offense and 
increasing penalties to offences involving the drug would lead to more bad actors facing criminal 
liability.121 
C. THE FEDERAL ANTI-KICKBACK STATUTE  
a. Background of the AKS 
 The third federal law that this article will explore is the federal Anti-Kickback Statute 
(AKS). This federal law prohibits the knowing and willful solicitation, receipt, offer, or payment 
of any remuneration (including any kickback, bribe, or rebate), directly or indirectly, overly or 
covertly, in case or in kind, in return for the referral of any individual for the furnishing of any 
item or service for which payment may be made in whole or in part under a federal health care 
program, such as Medicare or Medicaid.122 The AKS also prohibits remuneration knowingly and 
willfully exchanged in return for “purchasing, leasing, order or recommending purchasing, 
leasing, or ordering any good, facility, service, or item for which payment may be made in whole 
or in part under a federal health program.123 
 The goal of the AKS is premised upon the concern that health care kickbacks can lead to 
corruption of professional medical decision making, patient steering, overutilization of health 
care items (such as opioids), services, and supplies, increased costs to federal health care 
 
120 H.R. 1614, 116th Cong. (2019); S. 724, 116th Cong. (2019). 
121 H.R. 1781, 115th Cong. (2017); The amendment would have allowed for temporary scheduling of a substance if 
the DEA Administrator found that “the drug or other substance satisfies the criteria for being considered a synthetic 
opioid” and “adding such drug or other substance to the definition of synthetic opioids will assist in preventing 
abuse or misuse of the drug or other substance.” 
122 42 U.S.C. §§1320a-7b(b)(1)(A), (b)(2)(A) (2012).  
123 42 U.S.C. §1320a-7b(b)(1)(B), (b)(2)(B) (2012).  
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programs, and unfair competition among doctors and health care facilities.124 The Department of 
Health and Human Services makes it clear to physicians that it may be acceptable to reward 
those who refer business in some industries, but in the federal health care programs, paying for 
referrals is a crime.125 In United States v. Patel, the Seventh Circuit issued an important ruling 
regarding the meaning of the term “refer.”126 Although prior courts largely agreed that a 
“referral” means sending patients to a certain provider, the Seventh Circuit adopted a broader 
interpretation, holding that a physician makes a referral for a purposes of the AKS when he or 
she makes a “certification or recertification” that care is necessary, even if the physician never 
steered patients to the particular provider.127 This expansion is important because it gives 
prosecutors broader range to charge physicians with an AKS violation because they did 
something that allowed a patient to receive care from a provider when they otherwise would not 
without the physicians referral.  
 An AKS violation is punishable as a felony. Individuals convicted of an AKS violation 
shall be fined not more than $100,000, imprisoned for not more than 10 years, or both.128 With 
respect to violations, a prosecutor must not prove actual knowledge or specific intent to commit a 
violation of the AKS. Instead, the government has a lower burden and must only prove that the 
individual “knowingly and willfully” intending to do something wrong.129 A violation of the 
AKS can also subject a defendant to exclusion from future participation in federal health care 
 
124 A Roadmap for New Physicians: Fraud and Abuse Laws, U.S. Dep’t Health & Human Servs., Off. Inspector 
Gen., https://oig.hhs.gov/compliance/physician-education/index.asp (last visited Apr. 5, 2020) (listing concerns 
raised by health care kickbacks). 
125 See id. at 4.  
126 See United States v. Patel, 778 F.3d 607, 609 (7th Cir. 2015). 
127 Id. at 612–18. 
128 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(1), (2) 
12942 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(h); see also United States v. Greber, 760 F.2d 68, 72 (3d Cir. 1985) (establishing the “one 
purpose” rule which states that as long as there was only one purpose to induce the ordering of services, then the 
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programs as well as civil monetary penalties.130 The AKS covers the payers of the kickbacks – 
those who offer or pay remuneration – as well as the recipients of kickbacks – those who solicit 
or receive remunerations.131 Each party’s intent is a key element of their liability under the AKS.  
b. Enforcement of the Anti-Kickback Statute in the context of Opioids  
 The AKS is used to combat the opioid epidemic form several angles, whether it be street 
level dealing by physicians or corporate greed by pharmaceutical companies. Both physicians 
and non-physicians violate the Anti-Kickback Statute if they receive remuneration from 
pharmaceutical companies in the exchange for opioids prescriptions. On the other hand, the AKS 
is also enforced against those same companies who offer illegal remunerations to physicians for 
unnecessary prescriptions and promotions.  
 One of the most notable health care fraud prosecutions in recent years was against Insys 
Therapeutics Inc., who played a large role in increasing the over prescription of opioids across 
the country.  Former executives and managers of Insys Therapeutics, were charged with 
conspiracy to violate the Anti-Kickback Statute Law in relation to a nationwide conspiracy to 
bribe medical practitioners to unnecessarily prescribe their fentanyl-based pain medication and 
defraud payers of the medication, including insurers.132 These top executives of Insys paid 
kickbacks and committed fraud to sell a highly potent and addictive opioid that led to abuse and 
life threatening respiratory depression of many patients.133  
 In turn, there have been a number of cases in which physicians were convicted of 
violating the AKS for receiving or accepting remunerations from pharmaceutical companies in 
 
130 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(b)(7) 
131 See A Roadmap for New Physicians: Fraud and Abuse Laws 
132 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, U.S. Attorney's Office, Dist. of Mass., Pharmaceutical Executives Charged 
in Racketeering Scheme. (Dec. 8, 2016). https://www.justice.gov/usao-ma/pr/pharmaceutical-executives-charged-
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turn for prescribing prescription opioids.134 For example, in November 2019, a New 
Jersey/Pennsylvania doctor pled guilty to accepting bribes and kickbacks from Insys 
Therapeutics, in exchange for prescribing more than 28 million micrograms of Subys, a powerful 
opioid narcotic.135 Kenneth Sun, M.D, participated in a scheme to receive over $140,000 in 
bribes and kickbacks from Insys in exchange of prescribing large volumes of Subys. Subys 
contains fentanyl, a synthetic opioid pain reliever which is approximately 50 to 100 times more 
potent than morphine.136 Sun admitted of proscribing Subys to patients for whom Subys was 
medically unnecessary, not eligible for insurance reimbursement and unsafe.137 The scheme 
involving both Insys and Sun disguised the bribes and kickbacks as “honoraria” for education 
presentation regarding the narcotic that Sun purportedly provide to other doctors.138 These 
presentations were a sham. Sun admitted that he defrauded the government by causing Medicare 
to pay more than $847,000 for Subys prescriptions that were medically unnecessary, procured 
through the payment of kickbacks and bribes and not eligible for Medicare reimbursement.139  
 Kenneth Sun is not the only doctor who has received remunerations in exchange for 
prescribing Subys. In January of this year, a Manhattan doctor was sentence to nearly 5 years in 
prison for accept bribes and kickbacks from Insys Therapeutics. Dr. Alexandru Burdecea began 
prescribing Subys in 2015 –  a drug that he previously never prescribed before – in exchange for 
 
134 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, New Jersey/Pennsylvania Doctor Pleads Guilty to 
Accepting Bribes and Kickbacks in Exchange for Prescribing Powerful Fentanyl Drug. (Nov. 22, 2019) 
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bribes from Insys and became the 14th highest prescriber of the drug in the country with a net 
sale of the drug of approximately $621,345 in that quarter.140 Burdecea was one of five doctors 
who were convicted of participating in Insy’s “Speakers Bureau.” This scheme involved a roster 
of doctors across the country who would conduct programs purported aimed at educating other 
practitioners about Subys.141 However, in reality, the Speakers Bureau was used to induce 
doctors who served as speakers to prescribe large amounts of the drugs and paying them in 
Speakers fees.142  
 Physicians who receive remunerations from pharmacies or laboratories also violate the 
Anti-Kickback Statute.143 In 2014, Dr. Carl Dennis Fowler, was convicted of violating the AKS 
when he received remuneration from a pharmacist in exchange for opioid prescriptions.144 Dr. 
Fowler wrote numerous prescriptions for OxyContin and oxycodone, without regard to whether 
the drugs were medically necessary and filled to Patel Pharmacies, which were later resold on the 
street market.145 In return, Dr. Fowler received kickbacks for writing the prescriptions that were 
filled to Patel Pharmacies and that were billed to Medicare and Medicaid.146 Further, physicians 
who also receive remunerations in return for referring government program patients to particular 
laboratories for opioid and other drug testing services implicate the AKS.147 In 2017, a 
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Pennsylvania doctor was sentenced to 84 months in prison and $2.3 million in restitution for 
referring his Medicare and Medicaid patients to a lab in which he was in a joint venture with.148 
Under the AKS, the fraudulent use of government money matters. Similar to the FCA, 
the Act is concerned with defrauding federal health programs such as Medicare and Medicaid. 
Under the AKS, even if a service is given by the physician or laboratory, a falsity still exists 
because it is tainted by a kickback at the cost of federal health care programs. However, the 
requisite that there a federal health care program must be involved and the defrauding of 
government money must occur may also be limitation to AKS prosecutions. This limitation and a 
possible remedy will be explored in the next section discussing the enactment of EKRA.  
D. THE ELIMINATING KICKBACKS IN RECOVERY ACT  
a. Background of EKRA 
 The federal government has enacted a massive new initiative to address the nation’s 
opioid crisis and health care fraud that accompanies it. President Trump signed into law the 
SUPPORT for Patients and Communities Act in 2018, which is a comprehensive legislative 
initiative comprised of 70 individual bills intended to address the opioid crisis and substance 
abuse.149 The SUPPORT Act appropriates millions of dollars from the Treasury and federal 
Supplementary Medial Insurance Trust Fund to support federal agencies in their initiatives to 
combat the opioid epidemic.150 This next section will focus specifically on Sections 8121 and 
8122 part of the SUPPORT Act that establishes the Eliminating Kickbacks in Recovery Act of 
2018 (EKRA). Of the many consequential provisions, EKRA is one that could have a significant 
impact on those involved in addiction recovery efforts and treatment facilities. Section 8122 now 
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makes it a federal crime to pay for referrals to recovery homes, clinical treatment facilities and 
laboratories.151 Violations would be punishable with criminal penalties such as monetary fines, 
imprisonment, or both  
  The Eliminating Kickback in Recovery Act is designed to build on the prohibitions set 
forth in the federal Anti-Kickback Statute. EKRA prohibits anyone from knowingly and 
willfully: (1) soliciting or receiving any remuneration in return for referring a patient to a 
recovery home, clinical treatment or laboratory; or (2) paying or offering an remuneration to: (1) 
induce a referral of an individual to a recovery home, clinical treatment facility, or laboratory in 
exchange for an individual using the services of the recovery home, clinical treatment facility or 
laboratory.152  In other words, EKRA is narrower in this sense as it only applies to referrals of 
certain types of facilities, namely recovery homes, clinical treatment facilities, and laboratories. 
EKRA does not preempt the Federal AKS or state law on the subject matter. So, in terms of 
practicality, ERKA cannot be used when the AKS applies.153 
  EKRA addresses Congress’s growing concerns about patient brokering in connection 
with substance abuse treatment centers. Patient brokers are those who profit off of patients 
seeking substance abuse treatment through “illicit referrals,” including “patient brokers who take 
advantage of patients with opioid use disorders by referring these patients to substandard or 
fraudulent providers in exchange for kickbacks.”154 The legislative intent was clear: Congress 
included EKRA to the bill to crack down on individuals and companies taking advantage of and 
 
151 See Eliminating Kickbacks in Recovery Act of 2018 §§ 8121-8122. 
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exploiting vulnerable patients seeking addiction treatment,155  as well as to close the gap left by 
the Federal AKS.156  
 This provision is also significant because although there are similarities with the Federal 
AKS, there are several defining distinctions. The Federal AKS already prohibits an individual to 
knowingly and willfully provide anything of value in return for or to induce or reward referrals 
of patients covered by federal health care programs. Rather than amend the Federal AKS, EKRA 
creates a new, separate provision that makes remuneration illegal as to patients covered by 
private health care plans as well.157 Senator Amy Klobuchar (D-MN), one of three senators who 
introduced this bill, noted that such kickbacks are already illegal under federal health care plans, 
“but there is no Federal law to prohibit them in private health insurance plans.”158 She states, 
“when people are struggling with addiction, their focus should be on getting well, not worrying 
whether treatment facilities are trying to take advantage of them to make more money.”159 The 
DOJ explained why EKRA’s expansion to people on private health insurance was needed: 
“Patients in substance abuse treatment facilities are not usually Medicare beneficiaries, but often 
people on private insurance, or often times people in their twenties, who are still on their parents’ 
plans.”160 Patients who are most vulnerable who are suffering from addiction and substance 
abuse are essentially “treated as cash registers…”161 However, although EKRA is well-
intentioned, the following subsection will discuss some of the limitations in the language of the 
statute that have raised concerned for stakeholders as well as enforcers of act. 
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b. Limitations to ERKA 
 First, the statute contains broad definitions that may cause discrepancies in enforcement. 
EKRA defines “recovery home” as “a shared living environment that is, or purports to be, free 
from alcohol and illicit drug use and centered on peer support and connection to services that 
promote sustained recovery from substance use disorders.”162  “Clinical treatment facility” is 
defined as “a medical setting, other than a hospital, that provides detoxification, risk reduction, 
outpatient treatment and care, residential treatment, or rehabilitation for substance use, pursuant 
to licensure or certification under state law.”163 “Laboratory” is defined to include all clinical 
laboratories, and thus all referrals for clinical laboratory tests implicate EKRA regardless of 
whether the tests relate to substance abuse testing or treatment.164  
 The definitions of “recovery home” and “clinical treatment facility” appear to lend 
support to the legislative intent of the SUPPORT Act, however the broad definition of 
“laboratories” does not, and may lead to unintended consequences in enforcement. Importantly, 
EKRA does not define the term “referral.” “Because its prohibition against kickbacks is limited 
to remuneration paid in exchange for referrals or an individual’s use of services, an authoritative 
interpretation of the term ‘referral’ under EKRA is necessary to determine the scope of the 
law.”165  Based on these definitions, EKRA establishes a new “public and private payor intent-
based criminal anti-kickback law that prohibits any form of remuneration in exchange for 
referrals to, or an individual’s use of, all entities that meet the definitions of recovery homes, 
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clinical treatment facilities, and laboratories”– including referrals to laboratories unrelated to 
substance abuse testing or treatment.166  
 Confusion in enforcement may start with the statutory interpretation of the term 
“referral.” Under the AKS, although not defined, a referral, has been traditionally viewed to 
apply to provider referrals. This is similar under EKRA, but it omits the statutory language that 
the federal government has historically used under the AKS to apply that law to marketing and 
sales activities.167 The lack of a definition for “referral” will likely cause the DOJ to come up 
with regulation to clarify the meaning under EKRA so that it applies to marketing and sales 
agents consistent with its legislative intent.168 EKRA’s broad statutory language in its prohibition 
of remuneration in exchange for an individual using the services of a recovery home, clinical 
treatment facility or lab is written that it may also apply to remuneration received by a patient for 
his/her receipt of services by such an entity.169 This discrepancy may diverge from the Act’s 
legislative intent as well.  
 Furthermore, under EKRA, many existing relationships in the healthcare industry will 
need to be modified in order to comply with the statute and to avoid risk of criminal liability. In 
the context of laboratories, EKRA’s broad language appears at first keen to prohibit laboratories 
from paying commissions to an employed sales force, however to end commission-based 
compensation for laboratory sales personnel would dramatically impact a common practice 
among labs.170 It is common practice among laboratories to use employed sales representatives to 
recommend or arrange for providers to purchase their services, and pay employees based on the 
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volume or value of business they generate.171 Prior to EKRA, this practice was uncontroversial 
because the AKS excepts, “any amount paid by an employer to an employee (bonafide 
employment relationship) for employment in the provision of covered items or serviced.172 
However, EKRA does not have a parallel exception and its broad definition of “laboratories” 
does not limit these circumstances to drug-related testing.  
 Due to EKRA’s recent enactment only two years ago, there have not been many 
convictions under this law for its impact to be determined yet. What is presumably the nation’s 
first EKRA conviction occurred early January 2020 in Kentucky, when Theresa Merced admitted 
in federal court that she solicited kickbacks from a toxicology laboratory in exchange for urine 
drug testing referrals.173 Merced was the office manager of a substance abuse treatment clinic 
and solicited kickbacks from the CEO of a toxicology lab in exchange for urine drug test 
referrals.174 The 80-year-old woman is scheduled to be sentenced on May 1, 2020, and faces up 
to 20 years in prison and a maximum fine of $250,000.175 
c. EKRA’s Effectiveness on Combatting the Opioid Crisis    
 The Eliminating Kickbacks in Recovery Act seems to be well intended. It is Congress’s 
attempt to address kickback schemes that fall short of the Federal AKS in connection with 
patient brokering activities associated with substance abuse treatment and recovery efforts. It 
provides the federal government another legal tool that can be used in prosecuting those who 
exploit those suffering with addiction and drug abuse by referring them to insufficient or 
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fraudulent providers in return for kickbacks.176 However, because of the law’s broadly drafted 
definitions, there may be statutory consequences that exceed the initial legislative intent.177 
While EKRA was in fact enacted to prohibit patient brokering of substance abuse patients on 
behalf of substance abuse treatment providers and facilities, EKRA also applies to referrals to 
laboratories unrelated to substance abuse treatment.178 
 It is important to note that although these definitions raise concerns for enforcement, its 
expansion to prosecute actors who offer and receive kickbacks outside of the federal health care 
setting is a step in the right direction in eliminating any gaps that existed under the Federal AKS. 
However because of EKRA’s expansive reach to the private health industry, many existing 
relationships in the health care industry will need to be modified to comply with the new law and 
to avoid risk of criminal liability.179 The entire SUPPORT act is a wide-ranging provision that is 
intended to add to the roster of tools intended to cure the opioid crisis.180 As more cases are 
prosecuted by the DOJ under EKRA, its legal effectiveness as well as its deficiencies will be 
determined.  
III. CONCLUSION 
 This article has identified and discussed several legal tools that the federal government 
uses to combat the over-prescription of drugs and the growing opioid crisis plaguing the United 
States.  The False Claims Act, although not designed to be an anti-fraud statute, has played a 
critical role in prosecuting bad actors across the health care supply chain. The FCA creates 
liability not just for those who submitted false claims, but also for those who “cause” false 
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178 See id.; See also 18 U.S.C. § 220(a); 18 U.S.C. § 220(e)(4).  
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reimbursement claims to be made or “cause” false statements to be made in connection with 
claims for reimbursement. Thus, the FCA is able to prosecute individual physicians filing false 
claims to pharmaceutical companies who cause a doctor to file a false claim. With its qui tam 
provision, also known as its whistleblower powers, the federal government can initiate 
investigations as well as impose civil monetary penalties on bad actors. Because of the its treble 
damages provision, some of the largest settlements under the FCA have been by pharmaceutical 
manufacturers, like Pfizer and Insys Therapeutics Inc.181 Like many federal provisions, the FCA 
has its limitations. For one, the government can only prosecute false claims involving the 
defrauding of a federal health care program. Claims involving the private health insurances do 
not fall under the realm of the FCA. As EKRA is to the AKS, it would be interesting to see an 
amendment or legislative counterpart to the FCA that covers false claims as to private health 
insurance business. Moreover, factually false claims, including claims for medical services never 
provided certainly can increase unnecessary costs to federal health care programs. However, it 
can be argued that these false claims do not contribute to the patient injury side of the opioid 
crises because there were no patients actually prescribed the opioids.182 Despite this, the FCA is 
viewed as one an important tool in combatting the opioid epidemic.183 
 The article then examines the effectiveness of the Controlled Substance Act in 
combatting the opioid crisis. The CSA, which classifies both prescription and illicit drugs into 
schedules based on its potential for abuse, imposes criminal penalties on those who illegally 
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183 Nekia Hackworth Jones, The DOJ's Latest Opioid Crime-Fighting Tool: The Civil 
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sweeping opioid epidemic", and "[t]he use of the FCA is part of a larger DOJ strategy to develop multi-faceted 
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possess, distribute, manufacture or prescribe controlled substances without being a proper 
registrant of the DEA. The CSA’s prosecutions are not limited to registrants under the DEA. The 
CSA has been successful in the prosecutions of individual physicians and pharmacies who act as 
drug dealers and pill mills through the over-prescription of opioids. The CSA is also seminal in 
controlling the amount of controlled substances that may enter into the market. Manufacturers 
and distributors who are in violation of the overproduction of opioids are successfully prosecuted 
under the CSA. The threat of criminal penalties and the threat of losing DEA registrant status has 
been key to deterring bad actors from violating the CSA and an efficient tool to combat the 
opioid crisis.  
 The article then explores the Federal Anti-Kickback Statute, which prohibits the 
remuneration of anything of value in return for the referral of patients or medical services. The 
federal government uses the AKS as a tool to cut off opioid over-prescribing and over-referring 
induced by remuneration. The AKS has been successful in prosecuting large pharmaceutical 
companies and their executives, as well as individual doctors or pharmacies who accept 
remuneration in return for their prescriptions. The AKS has been effective in combatting opioid-
related health care fraud, abuse and for protecting patients in cases in which a prescriber’s 
medical judgement has been tainted by illegal kickbacks.184 Additionally, the AKS has been an 
effective tool for purposes of prosecuting bad actors like Dr. Kenneth Sun185, whose opioid 
prescriptions were fueled by greed. It must be noted that the AKS also has its limitations in their 
application to federal (versus private) health care program business. Like the FCA, the federal 
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AKS does not apply to patient recruiters who offers to pay for remunerations from private health 
insurance business.186  
 Lastly, the article briefly explored the Eliminating Kickbacks in Recovery Act of 2018. 
This act was incorporated in SUPPORT for Patients and Communities Act. EKRA is designed to 
focus on health care fraud (specifically kickbacks) in the context of opioids and crack down on 
those bad actors who exploit patients struggling with addiction by referring them to insufficient 
facilities or treatments in return for remunerations.187 Although this act does not prosecute bad 
actors who put medically unnecessary opioids in the hands of more users, it combats those who 
are exploiting drug addicts who are seeking help with their addiction. Importantly, EKRA fills in 
the gaps left by the AKS by making remunerations illegal as to patients covered by private health 
insurance. Because ERKA is relatively new, there have not been many cases surrounding the 
legislation yet. However, as more cases arises, it will allow us to determine is effectiveness and 
capability in the overall fight against the opioid crisis.  
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